Picks from Medhane Tadesse's Recent Analysis on Sudan

Key Issues

•    The NCP wanted the elections but not the referendum.Meanwhile,the SPLM is passionate about the referendum but not the election. For the NCP it is a major event; for the SPLM it is part of a process. Neither the Government of Sudan/GoS, nor the SPLM/A, willingly entered the run up to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement/CPA/, and even less have they been prepared to consider democratic transition as a major goal.

•    The SPLM is more interested in winning the south with out much violence and let the process go forward. Fortunately, the North i.e. the NCP is not interested in aggravating instability in the South during the elections as it doesn’t want to damage the legitimacy of the elections, a currency it wants to secure from the whole process. Besides, the NCP will not loose anything from the elections in the North. Both the SPLM and other northern opposition parties are not in a position to offer a strong challenge.

•    This weeks’ election will not be a conclusive election. Clearly, the NCP will win in the North and the SPLM in the South. This can be achieved without making too obvious rigging. This doesn’t look like an election anyways? It resembles a plebiscite on the NCP’s and SPLM’s rule in the rest of the country and the south respectively.

•    Using all tactics at its disposal, the NCP had cleared the two major challenges and possible complications to its eventual election victory, namely Darfur and the SPLM.Quite easily; the NCP secured the withdrawal of the SPLM candidate as well as monopoly over the available votes in Darfur.

•    Thus, due to the lack of a fair process, and  both in terms of its presence in Darfur, its financial resources, its grip on the media, and its success in dividing the main Northern opposition blocks, the NCP is at a visible advantage to win the next elections and legitimize its hold on power. The NCPs plan was to get enough votes at the first round and not to go for a second round. Now that is achievable. This is the price of holding elections without a democracy.

•    For many members of the international community the priority is the referendum. They had to sacrifice democracy in Sudan for the sake of a ‘promise’ to hold the referendum in January 2011. This is to be expected by the Government of Sudan and an array of regional powers and organizations as their commitment to democracy is questionable. But it points to the ideological weakness of the SPLM/A that in spite of its commitment to building a ‘New Sudan’ free of inequities, that in the rush for the spoils of office and independence this idealism has been forgotten. It also speaks to the narrow approach and fragmented focus applied by major global powers in the peace process.

•    Whatever level of rigging might be displayed, international players will accept the results as reasonably fair. Even in the face of massive irregularities, they have little cards to positively influence political developments in Sudan. In such an eventuality, the best thing external actors can do is try to convince Omar Al-Bashir form a kind of representative government. This is partly related to the fact that in recent years African governments are becoming increasingly assertive against external pressure, often for the wrong reasons.

•    The US, more than any other power, injected life into the Sudan peace process and continues to protect it from total collapse, but American motives for engagement have never been strictly confined to achieving a sustainable peace, and even less to Sudan’s democratic transformation. Worse, US Africa policy is not coherent and well coordinated, not because of lack of interest and vigor but due to clashes between personalities and different power canters in Washington. The Obama Africa Team (if there is one at all) is unable to provide leadership at the time it is most needed.

•    Finally, the end set of the CPA were three: Peace, Democratic Transformation of Sudan, and Self-determination of the people of south Sudan. The first two goals (peace and democratic transition) have already been compromised; the last one is hanging on the balance.