Reflections on Recent Military Politics in Somalia

Godane is erratic and unstable, overly obsessed with personal security and protection. He could be cutting and arrogant, and this provoked personal resentments.  The TFG lacks basic physical fitness to wage war against the insurgency. It promotes dysfunctional politics and its army is still weak and demoralized.

AMISOM’s War

Early 2011 saw AMISOM’s energy at its most impressive. The war in Mogadishu in February this year last a scant few days but it quickly pushed the insurgents from many areas out of the capital. A major development in Somalia in recent weeks is the deepening rift within the radical Islamist group Al-Shabaab, the AMISOM-supported military offensive in Mogadishu, pro-TFG military operations by various clan forces in Bay and Bakol, Beletwein and Gedo regions. These operations, still ongoing, have become possible mainly because most of the Al-Shabaab forces have descended to Mogadishu due to the military pressure from AMISOM and the confusion within the group’s top leadership.

AMISOM deserves, at least for a change, some respect. Many may decry its engagement as feeble, negligent and less strategic. To say so may sound grudging. It is not. Recently the African Military Mission to Somalia lucked into a double windfall: its robust mandate and the rift within the main insurgent group Harakhat Al-Shabaab. The split within Al-Shabaab provided a nice opportunity.

The Crisis within Al-Shabaab

The split within the top leadership of Al-Shabaab is real. Call it the great crisis to date-how exactly did this happen? Since mid 2010 the currentanalyst argued that several factors will continue to stand in the way of a united radical Islamic insurgency in Somalia. As early as January 2010 I wrote: “Nonetheless, the cracks within the fractured Somali Islamist camp are not only influenced by ideology and the recent rivalry and clashes have business and clan interests at its core. The business aspect of the conflict has become clear in the events surrounding the two French security advisors and the recent military clashes in the port of Kismayo. Individual clan and personal interests often clash and coexist with regional jihadist cells and agendas”.  I also argued that, the best strategy for the international community is to play into the divisions within Al-shabaab.There have always been cracks in Al-Shabaab’s ideology, strategy as well as vision.  We are probably witnessing a defining development.

The main axis of the division is between Ali Zubeyr (Ahmed Abdi Godane) and a group of leaders represented by Mukhtar Robow. To explain this, we must take account of the fact that the violent clashes and provocative accusations between the supporters of the two groups were much more extensive in recent months than late 2010. A serious disagreement, which has been going on for at least three months reached a climax when on January 24 Godane’s top confidant was killed by supporters of Mukhtar Robow in Mogadishu. Then Godane reportedly took a reprisal a week later by eliminating top Al-Shaabab military commanders sympathetic to Robow in Mogadishu. This ensued a series of arrests and clashes between the supporters of the two groups (the so-called Al-Taqfir group) in Lower Shebelle.

What marked the height of mutual suspicion and distrust is, however, the failed reconciliation meeting in the port city of Kismayo. On February 20, 2011 the pro-Godane clique of Al-Shaabab organized a ‘reconciliation’ meeting inviting all members of the group who posed the most challenge to his leadership. Suspecting what was in the plan the four major leaders who oppose Godane’s tactics and associations: Mukhtar Robow, Faud Shengole, Abdullahi Ragge and Sheikh Dahir Aweys boycotted the meeting, a move which marks the irreversible nature of the split within the group.

The division is partly ideological, reinforced by differences on war tactics, the denial of access to humanitarian aid and Godane’s fascination with foreign fighters, as well as the extreme ruthlessness by which he wages his war against the Somali people. This is compounded by the need to impose a totally foreign brand of Islam.  Godane is erratic and unstable, overly obsessed with personal security and protection. He could be cutting and arrogant, and this provoked personal resentments.  His efforts at international jihad and his brutality earned him enemies. The pressure from Somalis gradually changed the nature of relations within the top leadership. I believe we are now witnessing the beginning of a full fledged feud between the two groups, with weekly murderous assaults in revenge for the previous week’s assaults and insults. This explains why the insurgency is weak and has lost ground in Mogadishu to AMISOM-led operations in recent weeks.

Mukhtar Robow (and his Team) is clearly gaining some confidence to challenge Godane and his increasingly dwindling support base, which is mainly made up of foreign fighters. The problem is serious. The big question is how the TFG and its allies would be able to operate in a changing environment. Is it possible to accommodate the concerns and ambitions of the group led by Robow, while the TFG itself is in a crisis?

The TFG is hopeless

The split within the Islamists does not automatically translate into an advantage to the TFG. Like Godane within Al-Shabaab, the president of the TFG, Sheikh Sherif Ahmed is increasingly weak and isolated. In other words, Islamists and extremists in both camps are becoming increasingly isolated in Somalia. Somalis and external partners alike know his regime is corrupt and unreliable while the alternative still look darker. The TFG lacks basic physical fitness to wage war against the insurgency. It promotes dysfunctional politics and its army is still weak and demoralized. The fractures within its top leadership are fatal. The parliament and its leaders are already striking back at the President by introducing last time mechanisms and instruments aimed at blocking Sheikh Sherif from prolonging his stay in office after June 2011. A similar conclusion by regional leaders and the US seem to point to an eventual change of leadership in the TFG. Sheikh Sherif’s relevance to the TFG is limited. He looks tired and disoriented, and has little appeal to the insurgents, including the so-called moderate Islamists. His loyalists could barely wait for him to deliver. The upheaval within top Al-Shabaab leadership presents the TFG and its external players with two choices. They can engage with the splinters, stand on the sidelines, and accept whatever results. The TFG was expected to take advantage of this by either reaching out to the splintering groups or mounting a military push. This requires sound political and military strategy. At the moment, however, the TFG possesses neither. Despite the recent show of force by AMISOM in Moqadishu, the ‘TFG army’ proved useless

Conclusion.

Events in Somalia are difficult to predict. But one thing is sure: the radical group Al-Shabaab is losing the momentum. It may try hard to adjust to the internal crisis of the moment and move on, but the underlying causes of the problem will continue to grow, eating away at the cohesion and dynamism of the group. Most importantly, it is refreshing to see that external allies of the TFG, particularly the US may be able to adopt a strategy that ultimately plays into the divisions within Al-Shabaab.