Drivers of Youth Radicalization in East Africa

Somali youth do not only join Al-Shabaab but also street gangs in the United States. As such specific domestic and external context does matter.

Drivers of Youth Radicalization in East Africa: Key Issues

The academic literature on radicalization and violent extremism is new and diverse, and exhibits empirical and logical problems. Hence, this presentation will try to face up to commonly accepted ideas and theories. It will attempt to reframe and disaggregate the evidence-base but also reinforce some commonly held assumptions.

Why?
Terrorist organizations in Africa, such as Harakhat al-Shabaab/Al-Shabaab/ and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb/AQIM/, pose an increasing threat to sub-regional peace and security. A recent addition to the list is the Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria. The degree to which they become more transnational also raises grave concern for the international community.

Why East Africa?
The sub-region is:
-    A major theatre for ‘the war on terror’
-    A Hot bed for radicalization
-    Home to multiple and complex insurgencies
-    Features a youth bulge
-    Accommodates Diaspora radicalization
-    Characterized by fragile states and ungoverned spaces
-    Anchored in the underlying truism: ‘The Prophet’ and Ethiopia
-    A net for militarized political culture, and
-    Harbors Islamist movements and an Islamist state

As political Islam captures state power in Sudan as well as the emergence of a radical Islamist movement in Somalia becomes real, manifest in the leading roles played by the Harakat Al-Shabaab in the recent conflicts in Somalia, the region becomes an ideal place for the study of radicalization and violent extremism in Africa.

Early formations of Islamic revivalist movements began to take shape around the region, particularly Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea in the late 1960's. Nevertheless, Islamism as a political movement in the Horn of African region traces its origins only to the 1980s. In late 1980's the National Islamic Front/NIF/ in Sudan-which was formerly known as Muslim Brotherhood successfully engineered a military takeover of power, henceforth embarking on a region-wide islamisation project? The time coincided with Islamic revival in Western regions of Ethiopia, and more importantly the emergence of Islamic Jihad groups in Eritrea.

Similarly, Somali Islamic fundamentalist movements were at their formative stage. The Somali fundamentalist movement, which has been active in Somali politics since the late 1980's, is rooted in the 1950's but was reinforced by state collapse in 1991 and the resultant civil war, international intervention, external influence, and the subsequent efforts made by the Somalis themselves at new patterns of political reconstruction in a bid to shape their own destiny. In the absence of such a sequence of events, Islamic fundamentalism would have remained politically marginal force in Somali politics.
 
The process of radicalization is a very complex phenomenon. Radicalization, particularly in the form of religious (Islamic) extremisms is largely attributed to:
-    The crisis of the states or its complete absence
-    The bankruptcy of modern ideologies
-    The lack of strong institutions and social service delivery, and most importantly
-    International connectedness

There are strong structural foundations for radicalization in East Africa. Radicalization has continued to spread building both on the economic decline, violent conflicts and lack of strong and legitimate states. It is also argued that the strength of political Islam in the sub-region, particularly Somalia lies in its ability to address the needs of certain groups that have been marginalized by both political processes and resource conflicts.  Clearly, the international dimension of radicalization is a major consideration. Somalia and Northern Nigeria could be relevant examples. As such specific domestic and external context does matter. Thus, applying society-wide broad generalizations to all the causes and the regions in question is misleading. To this effect, a comparative analysis of Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and the AQIM is crying for a researcher.

At another level the threat to traditional values and way of life and religious orientation that comes from globalization could be a determining factor. In many cases this is attributed to the perception of threats. In the face of a perceived and a common threat the Muslims tend to close ranks. Somalia and N. Nigeria (Pentecost) are good examples. A major driver is the presence of some form of religious and societal discrimination, particularly in places where Muslims are a small minority. In other cases in challenge to the preexisting religious equilibrium could lead to radicalization and extremism. Hence, the context matters a lot, as the problem of radicalization has multi-layered causes and manifestation. For instance, in Somalia the collapse of the state and international connectedness appear prominent. In other parts of the region, the youth bulge, lost opportunities, identity and a sense of marginalization turn to be the major drivers.

Islamic radicalism, while it has been at the center of much political and policy interest may not be the only source of radicalized violence. Nevertheless, it is easy to discern the causes of political Islam and radicalization than other forms of radicalization, youth vulnerability to fringe movements, such as left and right wing terrorism, the Neo Nazi Movement, street gangs and cults. Somali youth do not only join Al-Shabaab but also street gangs in the US. So, we should not read too much into the religion alone. The trend should be viewed as a subset of broader youth vulnerability to fringe movements.

The same reasons that push young Somalis to join Al-Shabaab can also push them to join street gangs. The reasons may lie elsewhere and are very specific. These include lack of skills and access to productive sectors, the weakness of social service institutions, inability to integrate fully to the society and host nation, the breakdown of the family, and finally the problems of mosque leadership.

Again these are fringe movements and those who join extremist movements do not represent the youth or the population at large. In most cases they are a tiny minority. In a way radicalization is ultimately an individual process particularly linked to social networks and personal relationships. In this particular context the role of social networks and group dynamics is critical. Compounding this is the influence of relatives, a neighbor or a charismatic local preacher.
That is why it is difficult to generalize across countries, regions and time periods; though the mutation of radical groups follows a certain trajectory and historical development of a particular period. And many of the radical movements have emerged in radically different social, political, economic environments. Again, social and economic conditions alone cannot explain the problems of radicalization and violent extremism. Youth vulnerability to fringe movements both left and right wing terrorism and violent extremism, street gangs and cults are more of a feature of the developed world. In the same token poverty alone cannot fully explain the long process of radicalization and violent extremism. To complete the process other factors and agencies need to be present.

Often, the situation could be marked by a poor education system stratified along socio-economic lines and disparate economic opportunities across segments of society. Frustrated expectations and relative deprivation of mainly educated youth represents a danger zone.  Moreover, perceptions of social exclusion and marginality in an environment of a youth bulge are a recipe for radicalization. These are warning signals that could increase the likelihood for young members of society being lured towards extremist causes.

Most importantly, the presence of an extremist infrastructure, the impeccable organizational discipline and widespread social networks (of Somalia. Nigeria), Islamic political and militant outfits, a failure of the moderate forces to deliver credible results, and myopic policies by regional and global powers further enhance radicalization and the influence of violent extremist forces. So the intersection matters. In some contexts some issues are important than others and we need to locate the problem in a long and complex process of interaction between multiple drivers.
In many countries of the sub-region the crisis of the state, the failure of secular and moderate forces to deliver credible results could provide a fertile ground for youth radicalization. But other internal and external actors need to be met before this translates to violent extremism. The rise and development of Islamist extremist groups in Somalia (even N.Nigeria) is the result of a long process. In many cases issues of identity, group protection and clan affiliation as well as associated material benefits and security may feature prominent. Unmet social and economic needs alone may not lead to potent radicalization. But unmet social and economic needs coupled with acute form of social exclusion could mark the beginning of a serious wave of radicalization. This doesn’t mean, however, radical and extremist organizations are the manifestation of a chronic socio-economic problem present in a given country or a given region.

In fact, in most cases socio economic problems may not be used by leaders of terrorist groups as a major weapon for recruitment. Nevertheless, it may still remain the case that drives the youth to join radical and terrorist groups. So there seem to be a gap between the official statements and manifestos of terrorist organizations and the drivers of youth recruitment. This partly explains the weakness of terrorist organizations and the frail member of their core membership. It may also explain why extremist groups are poor at governing. However, without such organizations and their leadership radicalization cannot be turned into violent extremism or terrorism. In order for this to happen there should be organizations that can frame and channel the relevant grievances in violent directions.

Assumptions and Pitfalls
•    All radical groups are not the same.
•    Every context is different
•    Socio-economic factors alone does not necessarily lead to radicalization
•    Leaders’ political agendas and rhetoric does not necessarily reflect the underlying causes
•    Strong states does not necessarily fare better in managing or addressing the root causes of radicalization
•    Youth discontent does not necessarily lead to violent extremism
•    Radical groups do flourish on society’s unmet needs, but not always the case.
•    Ultimately radicalization is an individual process more influenced by social networks and personal relationships than macro-level conditions.

Few Takeaways on Radicalization
•    Each situation and individual varies
•    Radicalization and violent extremism is not only religious or Islamic in nature
•    Youth radicalization is not normatively ‘bad’, or it must not be stopped. It can be an entry point for social mobilization and social change.
•    With all the hype, radicalization and violent extremism remains in the periphery
•    Socio-economic and political factors alone cannot explain the problems of radicalization and violent extremism
•    Issues of identity, sense of humiliation, oppression, ones perception of cultural and religious invasion is crucial.
•    International connectedness is pivotal.
•    The presence of an extremist infrastructure is a game changer
•    Radical groups and extremist organizations have multiple agendas, interests and incentives.