The Military Conflict in Somalia

Al-Shabaab’s military position has been greatly weakened due to both internal and external factors. Prominent among which is drought and famine, a loss of revenue from markets, the decline of financial support from external patrons, internal divisions and public disgust over their strict punishments, recruitment of child soldiers and indiscriminate bombing. But, then, the impact of a terrified Al-Qaeda leadership 'constantly on the run' and the Arab spring on the moral and financial health of the hard-line Al-Shabaab leadership should not be discounted. It is also severely outgunned by AU forces.

The past three months have witnessed a striking change in the fortunes of the violent extremist group in Somalia, Harakhat Al-Shabaab. A major development in Somalia in recent months is the deepening rift within the radical Islamist group Hara’kat Al-Shabaab, the AMISOM-supported military offensive in Mogadishu, pro-TFG military operations by various clan forces in Bay and Bakol, Beletwein and Gedo regions. This is compounded by a surprise entry of Kenyan forces into Somalia and the reengagement of Ethiopia in support of clan forces remotely allied to the Transitional Government of Somalia/TFG/. These operations, still ongoing, have become possible mainly because most of the Al-Shabaab forces have increasingly become disorganized and disoriented mainly due to the military pressure from AMISOM and the confusion within the group’s top leadership.

Fighting is still going on in many parts of Somalia between Al-Shabaab insurgents on the one hand and the TFG, TFG allied militias, mainly linked to Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamai’a/ASWJ/, AMISOM, the Kenyan army and recently Ethiopian forces on the other. The fighting stretches from Dusamereb in Central Somalia up to the Kenyan border. Several administrations recently created by clan militias loosely allied to the TFG are fighting back against Al-Shabaab insurgents in several parts of Somalia including lower Shebelle, Lower Juba, Gedo and Bay and Bakol areas. Fighting between Al Shabaab and fighters loyal to Shebelle Valley administration is still going on in Hiran region.

Al Shabaab has waged a bloody five-year campaign to drive the largely impotent government from power. But in recent months it left most of its bases in the capital Mogadishu, where it continues to launch low level guerilla-style attacks. Since June 2011 Al-Shabaab’s military position has been greatly weakened due to both internal and external factors. Prominent among which is drought and famine, a loss of revenue from markets, the decline of financial support from external patrons, internal divisions and public disgust over their strict punishments, recruitment of child soldiers and indiscriminate bombing. It is also severely outgunned by AU forces. The cracks within the fractured Somali Islamist camp are not only influenced by ideology and the recent rivalry and clashes have business and clan interests at its core. The main axis of the division is between Ali Zubeyr (recently replaced by Al Afghani) and a group of leaders represented by Mukhtar Robow. This is compounded by the need to impose a totally foreign brand of Islam. There have always been cracks in Al-Shabaab’s ideology, strategy as well as vision.  As predicted in June 2011 we are probably witnessing a defining development. But,then,the impact of a terrified Al-Qaeda leadership constantly on the run and the Arab spring on the moral and financial health of the hard-line Al-Shabaab leadership should not be discounted.

A military operation by Kenya in Somalia's south-central region has added to pressure on the militant group. On October 16, 2011, Kenya initiated military action against Al Shabaab, declaring self-defense.  They made initial successes against the rebel group chasing them out of Elwak, Dhobley and Bulla Hawo. This is being reinforced by Ethiopia’s reentry in to the armed conflict in Somalia. The Kenyan government has neither the financial clout nor the military knowhow to continue a protracted guerilla war against an elusive and mobile enemy in an alien terrain. Ethiopian support has become critical. To date, the Kenyan intervention not only shows little military advance. Unless supported by strong Ethiopian move in Central Somalia, there is a possibility that Kenyan army would be bogged down. The idea is to squeeze Al-Shabaab fighters retreating from Mogadishu, Lowe Juba and Gedo. Ethiopia is already supporting TFG allied militias in Gedo, Hiiraan and Galgudud but a new offensive on Bay and Bakol (Baidoa) is also imminent.

Although Ethiopia and Kenya have similar strategic objectives, they pursue different goals on how the buffer zones should be created. They share the same end set: the total defeat of Al-Shabaab. To this effect, they may also share intelligence and coordinate military strategies, including joint planning and training, but they differ on how some regions in Somalia should be reconstituted. However, so far the result has been remarkable. The Islamist insurgents in Somalia are militarily on the defensive, if not in disarray. For the first time in years, Al-Shabaab was ousted from the capital Mogadishu following an offensive by African Union forces (AMISOM) and the TFG. This must have provided an enormous opportunity for the TFG to control the capital and promote stability in areas where Al-Shabaab had retreated from.

Events in Somalia are difficult to predict. But one thing is sure: the radical group Al-Shabaab is increasingly losing the momentum. It may try hard to adjust to the internal crisis of the moment and move on, but the underlying causes of the problem will continue to grow, eating away at the cohesion and dynamism of the group. Though sporadic armed clashes still occur, the TFG and AMISOM forces have defeated Al-Shabaab and cleared them from the capital city. Most importantly, it is refreshing to see some degree of resolve and cooperation among countries in the sub-region. Unfortunately, the split within the Islamists does not automatically translate into an advantage to the TFG. The Government is too weak. Corruption is at its highest level. It is not only Islamists that are terrible failures at governance. This is also true about Somalia’s TFG. A major concern in Somalia is governance, in terms of accountability but also in terms of administrative capability in managing the newly recovered areas. Inevitably, warlords and militias will continue to create mini-states to fill the void left by Al-Shabaab.