Going Blind In Sudan's case

Going Blind in Sudan’s Case

Medhane Tadesse

Overview: the Horn’s Interstate System 

Sudan has the distinction of being the only African country which started a civil war even before it was decolorized and then- with a short break between 1972 and 1983- fought continuously ever since.  The spillover effect of the war in the sub-region has always been significant. By the second half of the 1980's the border regions and their inhabitants became pawn in an inter-state mutual destabilization strategy, itself a regional manifestation of the Cold War. Sudanese governments assistance to Ethiopian rebels (mainly Eritrean and Tigrean insurgents) was reciprocated with the Derg's support for the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/SPLM/, allowing it to operate during the 1990's from bases in Ethiopia, most of which were in the western Gambella region. The Ethiopian government was, with Libyan money and Soviet armaments, able to meet virtually every need of the SPLM/A after the latter's founding in 1983. However, a major shift in the international relations of the Horn of African region appeared in late 1980's.The National Islamic Front/NIF/ regime of General Omar El-Bashir came to power through a military coup in May 1991. The sixteen year long anti-Derg struggle brought the Ethiopian peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front/EPRDF/ to power in Addis Ababa. These pivotal events in the political history of the Horn of Africa also corresponded with the end of the Cold War. This was considered as the onset of cordial relations between the regimes in Khartoum and Addis Ababa. It was not lost on analysts of the region that the EPRDF had to some extent been politically nurtured in Khartoum and that the front, and particularly the Tigrean Peoples Liberation Front/TPLF/, the leading component of the EPRDF, had spent many years mobilizing among the Tigrean refugee population in Sudan.

Perhaps no group more than the NIF warmly greeted the assumption of power by the EPRDF and the end of the threat posed by the Derg. Partly as a pay back to Sudanese leaders and partly because the SPLM sided with the Derg in a bid to stop the advancing EPRDF army in western Ethiopia in the final days of the war, the SPLA was expelled from Ethiopian territory. Nonetheless, the Sudanese leadership was not content with these measures. As an ideologically driven party with a missionary zeal to export political Islam, the NIF government had a much clearer vision of its objectives. The NIF saw the good gesture of the EPRDF-led government as a sign of weakness and tried to exploit the new situation in Ethiopia to its advantages-as an opportune moment to introduce its Islamist politics to the country. In the early years after coming to power, the EPRDF-led government followed a cautious(often naïve) foreign policy based on non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, a desire to develop friendly relations with Ethiopia's neighbors, and an effort to stay clear of foreign entanglements. It showed maximum restraint towards the NIF in the face of Sudanese assertive export of political Islam to the country. Meanwhile Sudanese hostile activities against Ethiopia crossed the line after Egyptian Islamic terrorists, reportedly supported by Sudanese security apparatus, made an assassination attempt on the Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak when he was coming to attend an Organization of African Unity/OAU/ leader’s summit in Addis Ababa on June 1995. Ethiopia reacted rapidly and decisively, which abruptly changed Ethio-Sudanes relations and transformed the regional conflict system in a way that very few had imagined. This was a prelude to a change in regional power relations, which ultimately led to the most comprehensive peace process in the Sudan to date, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement or the CPA.This dictates policy analysts to interrogate the reasons that led to the signing of the most hopeful peace agreement in the Sudan in the first place and whether those reasons are alive or dead at this critical moment of Sudan’s political history. This explains more about the presence or absence of the requirements for peace in the Sudan right now, including the ranglings around the implementation of the CPA that we see today. Probably; the variables that forced the NIF to sign the agreement are absent. Confronting this fact is a prerequisite for dealing with the problems in Sudan in an informed and meaningful way.

Confronting the Regional Conflict System

Indeed, Sudanese regional policy during the 1990’ended up antagonizing all its major neighbors by 1995. The NIF’s aggressive attempts at exporting political Islam galvanized the countries of the Horn, and in particular Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda, to create a loose alliance against Khartoum often referred to as the Kampala-Addis-Asmara axis and launch military operations against Khartoum.  This alliance was, not surprisingly, backed by the US as part of a regional policy of containment against the NIF’s Islamist expansion. Although both Eritrea and Uganda supported Sudanese opposition groups notably the SPLA, it was Ethiopian military intervention alongside the SPLA inside Sudan that ultimately changed the balance of military power in favor of the South. Successive military training programmes and logistical support aimed at building the military capacity of the SPLA aside, contingents of the Ethiopian army almost single-handedly routed the Sudanese government army in successive military operations at the end of 1996 and 1997, including the Black Fox operation which led to disastrous military defeats of the NIF and its eventual readiness to involve in somehow serious peace negotiations with the SPLM.   This had profound implications on what happened in Sudan since 2004. The military shock alternated with a regional isolation strategy. One way of looking at the current impasse is whether we have a similar external element or not, that could positively influence a move for peace in the country. And the answer is no. To say the least, the process will become protracted and messy. The underpinnings of the regional/global power relations as well as capabilities, interests and incentives of the actors involved show this will indeed be the case for sometime to come.

Largely under reported by the international media, the Black Fox Operation and other Ethiopian led and managed military operations sent a shock wave to Khartoum, forced them to freeze (probably for the time being) their regional policies, including exporting radical Islam, a process that would become partly responsible for the rift between Omar al-Bashir and Hassan al-Turabi. Since then, the NIF (mutated to the NCP) tried hard, without much success, to achieve coherence in its ideology and political constituency inside Sudan. The same regional military developments were also enough to make Khartoum leaders realize their limitations and engage in serious though protracted peace talks that resulted in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement/CPA/ on January 9th 2005. Had it not been for the Eritrea-Ethiopia war of 1998-2000, the Sudanese regime was close to virtual collapse. At least to many inside and outside the government it appeared to have reached the brink of downfall. The armed conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia led to the collapse of the regional alliance against Khartoum. Besides, Sudan came out of isolation as Ethiopia and Eritrea quickly but separately sought rapprochement with Khartoum. Ethiopia for tactical (use of Sudanese oil for the war effort) military and economic reasons upgraded its relations first. This marked the transition from Sudan being under assault by the region to moves to achieve more conciliatory relations with neighboring countries. However, the new dispensation in the Horn’s international relations paved the way for the resumption of the IGAD peace process in Sudan, in which the so-called the Declaration of Principles, a document highly influenced by inputs from Ethiopia formed the basis. Formally led by IGAD but under the strong influence of the US and its allies (the Troika which includes Norway and the UK) the peace process produced a highly legalistic document, the CPA.

In many ways the CPA reflects Ethiopia’s foreign policy preferences and dilemmas towards the Sudan. Ethiopia wants to see a united and secular, probably democratic Sudan; as a result it is not eager to see, if not totally against, an independent south Sudan state.  From Ethiopia’s point of view the entry of Southerners and other marginalized peoples in to mainstream politics in Sudan could be strategically more important for Sudan and the region at large. This is probably because the Ethiopian leadership believes that southerners in government leadership in Khartoum would help neutralize the Islamist strategic goals of Sudanese leaders. It is also apprehensive that an independent south Sudan could descend into tribal enclaves and become ungovernable, an unwanted addition to the intricate regional conflict system, not to mention the structural problems Ethiopia faces in the region. A major failure of the CPA is that regional powers including Ethiopia have ceased to play a role in the process of its implementation. Another major requirement for any meaningful implementation of the agreement. Neither did the CPA stipulate a formal role for IGAD countries in monitoring implementation. Since Ethiopia’s chief security concerns remain overwhelmingly Eritrea and secondarily Somalia, it is unable to follow an assertive policy towards the Sudan. The key components of its Sudan policy are complexity and caution. The reactivation of the IGAD process is long overdue.

Confronting Flawed Assumptions

The CPA is one of the most comprehensive peace agreements that Africa has ever seen. This agreement was believed to have ended the last twenty-two years of North-South conflict. The North-South category is misleading; as there is a South in the North in its entire dimension i.e. in terms of political-economy and power relations. As the CPA was signed war and massacres were going on in the western province of Darfur and a low-intensity conflict was unfolding in the Eastern Region. The CPA is a lynchpin of the whole situation in Sudan at present. Very detailed (more than a hundred pages long) it was clearly designed with exhaustiveness in mind since the failure of the February 1972 Addis Ababa peace Agreement had often been attributed to its hasty and superficial wording. But in Sudan, the letter is one thing and the spirit is another. Even former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan was forced to warn on 5 October 2006- in a report to the Security Council- about the dangers of the selective implementation of the CPA.   Though the CPA is comprehensive as a stand alone document, it is not inclusive as a political document, as it left out major Sudanese political players both in the north and the south. It is no wonder, therefore, that reactions to the CPA and attitudes toward it varied widely. It has excluded all the major northern political forces from the negotiation process and also from the subsequent government of national unity, with predictable results.

Strangely, the agreement left the two signatories with 80% of a share in power, with a mere 20% for the rest. This is not proportional to the nature of actual influence and political constituency of the players in the country.  It was also based on the assumption, against enormous evidence of war spreading throughout the country, that the only significant conflict in Sudan was that between the north and the south. As much as it is an inequitable division of power, it encouraged other revolts in the country by groups fearful that their communities would be left out of the peace process. Worse, it helped legitimize the National Congress Party/NCP/   by allowing it to sign peace agreements with all groups as if it represents the Sudanese state, effectively sealing the possibility of regime transformation and a workable political transition in Sudan. However, the major threats to the CPA are the lack of political will in the north and lack of capacity in the south. There has been a consistent pattern of NCP tempering with the CPA from its inception. Most of the strategic clauses in the agreement that can make or break the CPA are frozen, paralyzed or frustrated.  The CPA calls for a border demarcation and a national census as a prelude to elections and a referendum on southern self-determination in 2011, which are far behind schedule and thus deepening the crisis and threatening to undermine the peace agreement. The continued tension and instability in and around Abyei is the direct result of this. Probably both sides are aware any military conflict could not be decisively won.

The north’s advantage in any war with the SPLA would be its technical military superiority but it lacks the manpower while the SPLA might have the human resources but suffers from poor degree of conflict readiness, lack of equipment and money and possible Khartoum-induced tribal strife. The greatest likelihood, which is mainly based on mutual weaknesses, is that both the NCP and SPLM will pull back from the edge of the abyss at the last moment and broker some kind of a cosmetic compromise always postponing and further complicating the resolution of the conflict in Sudan. As a result many among those who had been enthusiastic about the CPA became disillusioned as implementation fell short of expectations. Supporters of the agreement had hoped that it would bring about real change, in particular in the realm of freedoms and opening up the system. The CPA promised a democratic transformation, but nowhere is that evident. On the contrary it entrenched the statuesque. The international community on its part is both unable and unwilling to force the Sudanese leadership. On the contrary it continues to let itself be bullied and be manipulated by the NCPs perpetual brinkmanship. As a result, as some say Sudan has ceased to exist as a country, there are only (dried up papers of) peace agreements. Worse, each peace agreement intensifies the state crisis and brings the dismemberment of the country a step closer.

Confronting real/manufactured Choke Points

The border demarcation is complicated by the refusal of the Government of Sudan/GoS/ to accept the ruling of an international tribunal on the border of Abyei and the fact that the oil that provides the revenues for both Khartoum and Juba lies along the disputed border, including that of Abyei. This is further complicated by the emergence of new facts on the ground through the tribunal in the Hague that could change, or at least further confuse, the nature of the North-South border. There are other choke points: while the oil may remain (increasingly depleted) in the south, the pipeline will still be in the north. The conduct of the census is also complicated by the same border and oil concerns. No body knows the way out from these complications and the NCP is much cleverer at obfuscating them than the SPLM at clarifying them. A series of CPA-scheduled processes are likely to unravel in the coming year or so. The CPA and the process it fostered is facing crisis and, should conflict break out, the most likely scenario has it erupting on the North-South border. The worsening of the Abyei situation cannot be explained only in terms of the rivalry over oil but also about the drawing of the North-South boundary, who is going to vote, for what territory. Here again, identity is important a largely missing element in the census spearheaded by the NCP. The situation around Abyei (some refer to it as the Kashmir of Sudan) could be described as a catastrophe waiting to happen.

Arguably, the NCPs ability to pressurize and manipulate the SPLM accept a flawed census that does not show ethnic and geographic boundaries which will make the possibility of southern independence a difficult if not a highly complicated undertaking. No wonder, in the recent SPLM convention the idea of southern independence was relegated to a sideshow and the movement decided in favor of unity and participation in national elections. But at the same time southern public opinion is in favor of independence to the extent that it is ready to go back to war rather than accept any form of cheating on the independence referendum. Unable to deliver on security, economic and political fronts, the SPLM (including the international community) is in a limbo and less clear about its strategic choices, unprepared for both independence of the south or attaining political power in a united Sudan. Probably, the difference between the NCP and other players in Sudan, neighboring countries, or global players is that on things that matter to Sudan, the former seems well prepared, often for the wrong reasons. Ultimately, some kind of short-term but not less fatal, crisis management may emerge that produces agreement between the SPLM and the NCP to either postpone the elections or form an electoral coalition, something strongly favored by the latter because it would likely ensure the survival of both parties until the 2011 referendum. Even if things do not blow up in 2009, the post electoral climate will very likely be so deleterious that the probable attempts of the regime at thwarting or suppressing the 2011 self-determination referendum will provide the necessary material for an explosion. In this regard, therefore, the forthcoming elections might be the most dangerous event awaiting the country. The most likely long-term consequence would be the descent of the country into anarchy and a secession of the south after a number of years of conflict

Concluding Remarks

A major agenda item in the currentanalyst.com is the importance of the year 2011 for the Horn of African region, particularly Sudan. Nobody is prepared for what will happen in Sudan in two years time. Definitely the international community is the least prepared. Sudanese political leaders-except the NCP and for obvious reasons- are not working hard to positively shape political developments. They are neither clear nor capable to face the consequences of either two or more states. The region is also ill prepared to deal with Sudan. The tragedy is that everybody seems to count on the generosity of fate.

Endnote

1.Slightly modified from the memo written in 2008 by the same author. The original was primarily focused on comparative study of cotemporary history of the Sudan in terms of political landmarks and regional dimensions, and what this means to understanding the current challenges.

2.  Even before Sudan was granted independence in January 1956 disgruntled southerners launched the Torit insurrection that steadily increased the intensity over the next fifteen years.
3.  Medhane Tadesse: A memo on Sudan, March 2004.Towards an Energy-led Integration in the Horn.Fredrich Ebert Stiftung/FES/. December 2003.
4.  Discussions with DR.John Garang,May 2001,Addis Ababa.Several discussions with Ethiopian military officers and SPLA representatives to Addis at the time didn't dispute these assertions.
5. Prospects for Peace in Sudan. A briefing Paper. August-September, 2004.
6. Ethiopian Foreign and Security Policy White Paper. April 2003.
6. SC Renews UN Mission in Sudan for One Year, Sudan Tribune, 7 October 7. 2006,http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?Article 17992.
8. In the last democratic elections in Sudan, the NIF got only less than 18% of the vote.
7.  After the split with Turabi the wing led by Omar al-Bashir took the name NCP, while the Turabi faction mutated to the Popular National Congress/PNC/. It is believed that while Turabi may have been sidelined at the top level of the political ladder and the NCP, he still commands some following in the rank and file of the defunct NIF, including the NCP.