Picks on Somalia

Picks from Medhane Tadesse’s Latest Briefing on the Current Peace and Security Situation in Somalia

On the TFG:The Transitional Government of Somalia that came out of the Djibouti process in early 2009 was intended to be a government of national unity tasked with bringing political reconciliation and establishment of governance structures and security on the ground. The result is depressing. An unstable balance of military power exists, a direct result of the two recent wars in the capital, May 7-15 and July 10-12 2009 respectively. As much as the role of AMISOM was critical, the support given to the TFG president by closely allied clan militias has been pivotal. Neither the TFG with AMISOM’s support, nor insurgents in Mogadishu are able to consolidate control over contested territory in the capital.

The TFG remains vulnerable to asymmetric attacks. However, its resilience in front of sustained military assault shows the fact that it has the will and capacity to survive and strive. TFG II is not a spent force; retains hope and merits sustained external support. Nonetheless, everything is not the same in Somalia; much is new, and it would be grossly inaccurate to speak of the same TFG II or one Islamist insurgency, since there is no united front against the government or any other major issue that matters to Somalia. Meanwhile, the insurgency has lost the military momentum and faces internal crisis, apparently undermining its cohesiveness and command authority. But it is no less destructive.

AMISOM: more of hardware?

The African Union Mission to Somalia/AMISOM/ is best placed and is willing to assist the TFG; however, its capacity is somewhat limited in that it requires additional assets to fulfill its many missions. Three significant gaps in AMISOM are the absence of intelligence and analysis, poor coordination, and the lack of strategic focus and planning. AMISOM went to Somalia with its heart not with its head. It is more of hardware construct than a software engineering.

On Somali Islamists

The progressive fragmentation of the Islamist camp in Somalia has continued unabated. The Somali Islamists have differing, probably antagonistic, agendas on the nature and boundary of the would-be Islamic state. To some extent, the division within the insurgency is ideological. Besides, there seem to be clan and business considerations at play. The revolutionary impulse of the Jihadists has been obliterated, if not spent, and they are facing governance problems. They seem to be losing the support of the public because of acts of extreme brutality and radical religious views. As a result, they are starting to face significant logistic and operational shortfalls. They are more capable as an armed force than as a political movement. The radical elements in Somalia were designed to fight an insurgency, and not to govern; they are neither legitimate or credible nor popular as it was claimed by some. Arguably, they are neither inspirational, nor ‘transformational’. Under these circumstances, The TFG still remains to be the best hope for Somalia.

Having said this, it is very unlikely that a single, clan or ideological, military and political force will be able to impose complete control in Mogadishu and its surroundings. That will never happen anytime soon. Despite the continued reconfiguration of political forces, evidence suggests that the overall political situation is unlikely to change dramatically in the short-term.

On the International Community’s Role in Somalia:

The remarkable feature of international strategy on Somalia is its absence. Despite this or probably due to this the International Community’s support to the TFG is often erratic and insufficient to address the magnitude of the requirements. Relaying money, supplies or dumping arms is inherently operational, and painfully detrimental. The level and quality of external support falls short of the often ridiculous expectation that the world demands of the TFG. Donors are markedly incompetent; hopelessly optimistic but endlessly disappointed.