The Doha Accord: Perils of Peace Agreements in Sudan

'The signing of Peace Agreements in Sudan has come a long way and there is a need for a fresh look at the lifetime of Peace Accords'.

When I heard about it I expressed neither rapture nor anger, but a blend of wry delight and residual disbelief. Some years back I commented, and I must admit to the displeasure of many of my Sudanese friends, ‘Sudan has ceased to exist as a country and become a collection of useless peace agreements’. Very much so, and for good reasons. Most of the peace agreements are not broadly owned and respected, yet keeping the country in perpetual transition mode. Everything is a transition in Sudan, and remains as such. Alas, all the actors are not ready for a long term commitment to a constitutional order and normal politics. My preliminary reading is that what happened in Doha is not a uniquely important event.

What is Doha Worth?
A Framework of Agreement was signed On February 24 2009 in Qatar between the Government of Sudan/GoS/ and the Justice and Equality Movement/JEM/. Thereafter, the Emir of Qatar announced that his country would set up a US $1 billion fund for reconstruction and development of Darfur. Well done. And that is exactly what the world also wanted to pretend. The member countries of the Security Council commended the Emir of the State of Qatar, the otherwise cerebral Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, and the feel-good AU-UN Mediator, Mr. Djibril Bassolé, for their ‘contribution’ to the peace process.  The Emir is a master of the dramatic set piece that carries, without ever seeming contrived, small significance. There was a mention of the Chadian President Idriss Déby for facilitating the accord. Many others were not mentioned. If their presence in the signing ceremony was sardonic, the mear mention of their names was considered to be an embarrassment. Not to mention the unloved interventions of ‘the independent minded’ Qatar in almost all sensitive affairs in the Horn of African region.

The signing of Peace Agreements in Sudan has come a long way and there is a need for fresh analysis of the nature, course and lifetime of Peace Accords. What was this Doha Accord? Obviously, much is still unclear about the deal between JEM and the GoS, which have inevitably been compared with the Darfur Peace Agreement/DPA/ of May 2006, signed after protracted talks in Abuja. Pretty much like the DPA the recent deal in Doha was signed between the GoS and one rebel leader that was confused for the strongest Darfurian faction. The parallel is magical. What many outsiders failed to understand is that the recent deal is between a group that swank with little fighting and a government with an army that does not fight. What is the use of an agreement which is not inclusive and that does not address the real causes that led to the conflict in the first place. The pretence of signing an agreement with the ‘most powerful’ rebel group in Darfur is a sort of deception. The conflict has long mutated into a remix and slipped into unexpected direction.

An umbrella group of other factions, Liberation Movement for Justice (LMJ) are still waiting around the lobby, while the SLM of Abdel-Wahid Al Nur and Ahmed Andelshafi’I refused to participate. Reportedly, those present in Doha and its surroundings are expected to sign an agreement before March 15, ahead of the April 11 nationwide election in Sudan. One can also found other similarities with the defunct DPA. Back then, the mediators tried to push other Darfurians to join the Agreement with out success. Devoid of the necessary ingredients of a workable peace agreement, the DPA was a nonstarter. As one of my friends mockingly said, ‘nagging Darfurian rebels to join the DPA is like asking somebody to marry a dead corpse’. And the rest is, as they say, history. The fast changing situation on the ground pushed most of the rebel groups to the point of irrelevance. At present, the Western region of Sudan is beset by a unique cocktail of security challenges. Only against this background can one understand the nit and grit of the highly publicized Doha Accord. This begs the question-when is a peace agreement really a peace agreement? Indeed, this is the real question.

Driving to Nowhere
Peace agreements that do not address the underlying causes of the conflict are always a problem for all: the facilitators, above all the people on whose name they were signed, and ultimately the signatories themselves. And much more. Peace Agreements that are not inclusive and representative enough would only aggravate the problem and result in the relapse to violence. And one other thing: the proliferation of peace initiatives would only complicate the search for peace, often leading to the progressive fragmentation of political forces. A peace agreement without clear understanding and commitment by the parties, and a broader sense of ownership by the public would only fail. Most importantly, a peace agreement that doesn’t take into account the changing political and security terrain is going to remain artificial.

Peace processes, if they are not going to be decorative, should base their decisions on a regular assessment of the conflict situation and a detailed inventory of actors. As conflict progresses, the legitimacy, value and relevance of some of the political and armed groups changes to the extent that to continue dealing with them becomes pointless. The international community should decidedly avoid proliferating peace initiatives. Stop making peace processes a prized resource to fight for. Money plays a huge part in the making of this deal. And when I say money it is hundreds of millions. The Doha deal is a more-or-less Doha Debate type informative process; a brief moment of ceremony of an older kind; and a dash of old-fashioned Sudanese conspiracy. That probably is one major reason why this deal could also be different.

For more puzzling questions on the Doha Accord go to the CA-blog; comments are highly appreciated.