The Ethiopian Election: Nature and implication

If this is not the worst of outcomes, it is very far from good

An Election of its Own

The result of the recent elections in Ethiopia might have come as a shock to many. What lies behind the near total defeat of opposition parties in the recent elections is the combination of reduced trust in and decimated opposition at the political landscape. It is a logical extension of political developments since 2005. There was some room for opposition movements to campaign and make their points to the public through the media. Yet, it was never clear how this was supposed to help the situation. Some would argue that there was a debate on policies and strategies and the government attentively provided some financial support to the political parties. It seems doubtful, however, that this will be enough to turn things around, for at least four reasons. Uneven presence in the political terrain and many other vagaries of the electoral system discriminate against the already weak, if not feeble, opposition. The ruling party, Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front/EPRDF/ was not alone in the elections; it has been happily joined by the ‘great’ Ethiopian state.  We can argue about whether that greatness is always true, but in times like this, it definitely is.

In the capital city, where it lost all the seats in 2005, the ruling party won all of them except one. The whole opposition is effectively out of national parliamentary politics. How did this major colossal muddle arise? Apart from the advantages of the incumbency, the EPRDF enjoys a superior resource and organizational base. It is also a reflection of the attempts made at social delivery backed by a more focused and puffed up  public relations, laser-type mobilization of youth and women, and effective use of the extensive party machinery. And one more thing. The EPRDF did a lot to improve its pitch to voters. It had a campaign strategy centered on plenty of promising futurology. On the other hand, the opposition is disorganized- often out of context-and adopted poor campaign strategy which run the risk of sounding bleak. No wonder, there is deep skepticism towards opposition politics.

Those of us who viewed elections as important components of conflict management, political transitions and democratization can take no comfort from the kind of election recently held in Ethiopia and its potential catastrophic consequences. A democratic African state hasn’t been around long enough to draw conclusions. But EPRDFs political aims couldn’t be easily fitted to democracy. The recent Ethiopian election is a certain kind of election. Clearly, it was not a sensational election. It has never been exciting, complex or tense either. This is an anomaly, particularly in a country with diverse political views, formidable strategic differences, disparate interest groups and losers with grievances. Partly, this is simply because the results were known. This cannot be the main reason though. The Sudanese election was equally predictable but it was also exciting. In Ethiopia, however, the 2005 election and its violent aftermath are still heavy in the minds of people.

It is also worth remembering that the EPRDF took a sequence of political measures aimed at granting the opposition a total electoral defeat with adroitness. All helped to saturate the components of a contested election and a fledgling multi-party democracy. Political transition through the approach applied by the EPRDF could not be taken for granted; but it can have unintended and adverse consequences as well. Things to watch are the very seeds of democracy. It is extremely difficult to talk about democratization with out strong opposition political parties, independent civil society, and a flourishing independent media. We are getting used by now to the troubles with in the opposition. The usual objection is the EPRDF puts unnecessary pressure on its opponents. Nonetheless, the opposition is capable of inflicting the biggest harm on its own survival. That doesn’t seem to be a major worry now. Rather, the political injection meant to squeeze and ridicule the opposition turned lethal and sent them into a death row. And so is the transition to democracy. This is an inoculation that has been administered without prudence.

Events in Africa recently show that the spread of democracy should not be taken for granted.  We set too much hope on elections and their outcomes, with out guaranteeing civil liberties and addressing the problems surrounding democratic institutions and processes. It is incomprehensible that elections are considered as a panacea, as turning points or an end to a timetable in a process of transition. However, democratic voting rights and free elections alone can not bring about democratic transition. Some people say that our political problems are structural, with no quick cure available; but I believe that one of the major structural obstacles to Ethiopian democracy is the obsolete doctrines and methods that govern electoral politics. The point in all of this is to approach the prevailing situation in terms of processes and institutions.

Implications

As Zhou Enlai is reportedly to have replied when asked about the impact of the French Revolution,’ it is too soon to tell.’ It is too early to conclude that this will usher in a definite transition of any kind, be it ‘democratic developmentalism’ or incipient totalitarianism. However, from a fair if not sympathetic account of the foreclosed election, one can put forward some general short-term outcomes.

My guess is that:

•    The EPRDF will achieve its most greatest and generous desire i.e. unchallenged authority and unconstrained power. Revolutionary democracy and ‘developmental state’ triumphs. The EPRDF could easily become the Party in an open-closed political experiment. The opposition will be pushed to the back-burner of Ethiopian politics with little influence to upset the institutions of political control and EPRDF’s power base. This will lead to a strategic review by opposition groups to understand the situation in a bid to learn to live with the new reality.This will not narrow the antagonistic relations between the ruling party and the opposition. Neither will it help foster normal politics or create a structured multi-party political system.

•    The best one can get from the new situation is, hopefully, a less corrupted civil elite and improved social delivery; one major component of god governance. The hope is that the public service responds with speed and transparency to citizens needs.

•    There are no secure conclusions about the future of peace and democracy in Ethiopia. The Derg is indeed behind us, but so too is the post-Derg moment of hope. Democracy is not by any means a direct heir to authoritarianism. The EPRDF, by a twist of sheer desire or default-probably unable to control and anticipate the real implications of fully achieving its own desire- is crafting a political process that has all the hallmarks of a prelude to dominant party rule. One should not exaggerate short-term threats and underestimate long-term risks.

•    The laser-type focus on economic development will continue unabated, leading to some pockets of prosperity, some pockets of freedom. People will continue to assert their rights, not in organizing against the state but in using election promises and laws to have a say. Some degree of harmonious discord will continue to exist between the two. The need for respect by the international community could also, to some degree, help restrain authoritarian instincts and totalitarian sensibilities. If this is not the worst of outcomes, it is very far from good.

•    There will be continuity in Ethiopia’s security and foreign policy. The regional implications, in terms of security and hard power, are less significant. Its support to anti-Shabaab Somali forces will continue both from within and outside the TFG.Ethiopia will approach the situation in Eritrea more proactively but with caution and complexity. Ethiopia is a statuesque power, and will remain as such.

•    If we consider elections less as a contestation for power and more as mechanisms for conflict management, then this is far from happening. The resolution of most of the countries political problems will be delayed, even if the EPRDF is close to total control of the country. Irrespective of its success in holding to power, the EPRDF-led political system is full of contradictions, and in its present form it could not be stable and sustainable. One such dichotomy is the need for economic growth and excessive desire for political control as understood and pursued by the EPRDF. Much will depend on how any possible tensions between a resolute focus on economic growth and civil and political rights can be resolved.

•    We should not expect much from external actors. Major global players and power blocks have long lost influence, and Ethiopia is effectively out of their hands. It is always hard to exert pressure on Ethiopia. That is that. Furthermore, Western money cannot buy the same leverage as before. The link between aid and democracy is fraying. Many African countries are becoming confident and assertive in recent years, no wonder prominent among which is Ethiopia. The historical reasons aside, the EPRDF and a different brand of African governments- that appear to be in open mutiny against Western style of democracy- are well equipped with political skills and updated methods to deal with external influence. They can quickly deliver some public goods as well. They are not intellectually lazy either. The contagion effect of the Ethiopian example need not be underestimated. The election result will get external acceptance,but this will fall short of securing international legitimacy. Lack of progress towards democracy in Ethiopia will continue to irritate Western donors.

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•    International policy is somewhat misconstrued. Major global powers are at great pains to focus on some issues and sub-regions. As such, in terms of foreign policy priority Ethiopia doesn’t exist at all, even Africa and many other places don’t exist. Most of the focus is on the triangle from Afghanistan to Turkey and Palestine. If there is any serious consideration towards the Horn at all it is some sort of regional stability. The Horn of Africa is a locus of several faultlines, and contains a mixture of different fragilities. Because of this or despite this, Western policy towards the region has quickly gravitated to the level of ‘avoiding the worst.’ When you go for minimum stability this is what you get. And for many, the situation in Ethiopia may not be good; it is not too bad either.

The results are troublingly obvious. Progress towards democracy remains under a cloud. And a less democratic Ethiopia and one which is dominated by one party will be an unhappy Ethiopia.