Uprisings in the Arab World and Africa: What to make of it?

For the citizens of several countries it has become a curiosity-driven enterprise. Many governments are clueless. Others are getting cold feet. And as with any self-interested institution, the military’s leaders can be counted on to ask: What’s in it for us, long and short term?

Uprisings in the Arab World and Africa: What to make of it?
The developments in the Arab world have powerful implications for Africa. For nearly two months the voices and actions of the Arab youth have captivated the world. Popular revolts continue to chart the world’s changing mental, emotional, diplomatic, political and moral landscape. It led to provocative discussions on the distinctive character of the Arab political tradition. Meanwhile, it has given many an emotionally stirring and, at times, almost unbearably disturbing sense of what the future holds. For many it is a matter of addressing governance’s thorniest issues. For the citizens of several countries it has become a curiosity-driven enterprise. Many governments are clueless. Others are getting cold feet.

The ongoing uprising in the Arab world mainly led by young people is a reality in many other African countries with slightly different contexts. The commonalities are breathtaking, but the peculiarities are also enormous. However, some structures of the population and security institutions as well as the capacity of governments to answer to the needs of their population may tip the balance.

First let’s look at the similarities that trigger successful uprisings. They are broadly speaking, six factors:
•    A cycle of tyranny and repressive governments
•    Youth bulge i.e. extremely large number of young population. An unstoppable force of unemployed youth(between 20-30% unemployment rate),and high concentration of such youth in the major cities
•    The level of social networking and access to the new media (such as Internet and Satellite TV). Indeed, among the triggers is the revelations by Wiki Leaks which provided the description of Arab leaders by Western diplomats as ‘Mafias’, ‘liars’ and so on
•    Economic problems, particularly a spillover from the international financial crisis that made the social injustice unbearable. Linked to this is the inability of the state to deliver on social services and operate in some form of a welfare state.
•    Widespread corruption and the organized rapt of national resources by Kleptocracies.
•    The securitization of social and political issues: the management of all tensions through security means, all combined led to what is happening in the Arab world or/and Middle East.

One can say, the above realities are present in many African countries with differing degrees;so the potential for instability is there. Clearly,the same ills are swelling in many African countries. The slight difference being the following:
1.    The youth in many African countries does not have one national identity linked to the same language of revolt peculiar to the Arabic language,which played a pivotal role in the recent protest movements in several Arab countries.
2.    Some governments can still focus on the unmet needs of the young population, try to talk and to some extent act in the direction of job creation for the youth.
3.    Most importantly, the nature and composition of security forces in sub-Saharan Africa is slightly different from most Arab regimes with few exceptions such as Libya, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia and to some extent Yemen. In these countries closer linkages to tribal affiliations makes political transition a bumpy road. Besides, the militarization and politicization of these linkages may serve the agendas and strategies of radical groups (Note: Tribal areas in Pakistan and Yemen).

The situation in many African countries is slightly closer to the group of countries mentioned above than Tunisia or Egypt, where the military is a respected institution with a pan-national character. If and when an uprising continues against all odds and persists in the face of violent reaction from the government, then the likelihood is that security institutions will unravel. This brings us to the most crucial aspect that could tip the balance as happened in Egypt and Tunisia, or for that matter Bahrain.

4.    The uprising in Tunisia and Egypt was relatively smooth for one more reason, in fact probably the main one: the military. As in nearly all police states where civil society is weak, the key to change lies with the military. Egypt’s military, calculating that it was no longer worth defending an 82-year-old, out-of-touch pharaoh with no palatable successor and no convincing plan for Egypt’s future, ultimately sided with the protesters on the street. There was another reason too. They were not happy with his supposed successor who has his own newly formed clique of business people in Egypt threatening the economic hold of the military.

So, for the top leadership of the military Mubarak was not only irrelevant but also, through his son, he has become a liability or a threat. This is a very important point on how the top leadership of the military decides in similar situations. The top brass of the military did not consider Gamal Mubarak as an outsider only (clearly he was not one of theirs as Mubarak was from the army), but also they viewed him for quite sometime as a rival in the political economy of Egypt. And as with any self-interested institution, the military’s leaders can be counted on to ask: What’s in it for us, long and short term?

5.    The most important issue is then how the top leadership of the army decides. It largely depends on whether the army associates its interest and continued survival with the incumbent, particularly the leader. Whether they think he is central to their future and are tired with him or not is crucial? If so, whether they think he is easily dispensable or not is an important variable. Probably, that may not be the case in several African countries.

Key Issues:
•    Every context is different
•    What is happening in the Arab world is not exactly a revolution; governments are collapsing but the radical change of the state is not in sight.
•    Most of the problems that have led to the popular uprisings haven’t gone away.
•    Democratic changes are coming, but democratic regimes are a distant prospect. Phase two of Ben Ali or Mubarak is a possibility.
•    Matters can get much more complex than what we are already witnessing. The fact that the nature of the deal was smooth remians a suspect, and it somehow bothers me.
•    Revolutions may inspire other revolutions, but this doesn’t guarantee successful revolutions in all countries at the same time. 1848 is considered as the year of revolutions in Europe, but revolutionaries were not victories in all of them. There were countries left out of the 1989 uprising in Eastern Europe too.
6.    The level of high concentration of socially networked and unemployed youth (a major aspect of the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt) with high degree of urbanization around Mega cities is also an important consideration.

Conclusion
There is a strong potential for similar uprisings in sub-Saharan Africa but the course and outcome could be totally different.  Disturbance may happen but would not automatically lead to the unraveling of the respective regimes. Critical though, governments cannot ignore the demands of their people; not any more. Even the Chinese government, I repeat, even the Chinese government is announcing that the ‘happiness’ of the Chinese people should be central to its strategy and legitimacy. This is as far as it can get in the short term. The question now is whether intelligent leadership can prevent the logic of protests from tipping many African countries into yet more political and social turmoil.