The killing of Bin Laden: What to make of it?

'I must say the political future of al-Qaeda will be determined by the course and outcome of the uprisings in the Arab world. As a result or despite this, there has already been a parallel decline in the organizational and operational capabilities of the organisation'. 

The death of Osama Bin Laden had struck a chord with many Americans and millions around the world. This was true not only of those who suffered from acts of terrorism, but of those who barely new about Al-Qaeda and its leader. Many others have been easily bamboozled. In the US however there is a sense of retributive justice done. Because of this sense of fulfilled vengeance, the death of bin Laden will certainly be one of those events that people will remember, like the 9/11 attacks themselves. Apart from the sense of justice and closure the killing of bin Laden brings, however, his death will likely have some practical impact on the jihadist movement and the war on terror.

The killing of bin Laden by US Special Forces in his, reasonably comfortable, hideout in Pakistan is another blow to the already declining al-Qaeda narrative. For the past several years, the leaders of the organization have been limited to fighting on the ideological battlefield, waging a war of propaganda and attempting to promote the ideology of jihadism in an effort to radicalize Muslims and prompt them to act. Al-Qaeda’s appeal and political support has been declining over the last couple of years until it suffered a heavy blow towards the end of 2010 due to the popular uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa. So, in terms of ideology, political slogans, agendas and narratives, the uprisings have embarrassed Al-Qaida and associates as well as other radical groups in the Middle East and Africa. I must say the political future of al-Qaeda will be determined by the course and outcome of the uprisings in the Arab world. As a result or despite this, there has already been a parallel decline in the organizational and operational capabilities of al-Qaeda. 

As argued in a previous topic (http://www.currentanalyst.com/index.php/revealed/156-obamas-common-sense), al-Qaeda’s top layer has become weaker, while its associates around the world have multiplied. Its core has become weaker while its affiliates have been stronger. The catch is that, the so-called  associates, sometimes referred to as ‘local franchises’ have not yet developed the operational capability that al-Qaeda proper once had to organize smart, sophisticated and large scale transnational terrorist attacks. Then there are those groups around the globe but who are not formally affiliated with the al Qaeda core or one of the regional franchises. And all of this has caused the al Qaeda core to become primarily an organization that produces propaganda and provides guidance and inspiration to the other jihadist elements rather than an organization focused on conducting operations.

In practical terms, long before the death of bin Laden al-Qaeda had become just a message, an idea or a sort of ideology. In fact it has become a trend personified by bin Laden. His picture, like his speech, was full of arsenal with a massive appeal. So his death will likely perpetuate the process of decline. Obama’s focus on decapitating the top leadership of al-Qaeda has paid off. Between the Arab uprising and the death of bin Laden, it is hard to imagine greater blows to al-Qaeda’s ideology and organization. This means that it is hard to believe the death of bin Laden will result in the death of the global jihadist movement: A man is dead but the ideology struggles to live on. Indeed, in some areas this may result in fervent anti-Americanism as a short term response to the incident. This may be particularly true of Pakistan. While the average Pakistani may not care too much about bin Laden, public sentiment is running very high against U.S. operations in Pakistan, and this operation could serve to inflame such sentiments.

Notwithstanding this fact, international terrorism is still real and it will continue to pose dangers to global security. Certainly, grassroots terrorists can and will continue to kill people, but they lack the ability to conduct dramatic, strategic attacks. There are still groups that call themselves al-Qaeda in Pakistan, Yemen, North Africa, Somalia and elsewhere. This is not the right place to go to the details of each organization and its regional ramifications.  But I will dare to say the results are mixed. Whenever there is smooth transition, such as in Egypt and Tunisia, terrorists are not able to find a foothold; meanwhile legally registered Islamist movements (such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Al-Nahda in Tunisia) will have the chance to further mobilize their supporters and entrench themselves. Indeed, such groups have gained long-term and strategic capital. The merger of Islamists and democrats is an explosive combination. Apart, they do little. Together, they could genuinely destabilize the region and even further undermine the U.S. effort against jihadists. Where as in situations of an ongoing violent conflict, such as Yemen and Libya, terrorist organizations will have more advantages to make an entry into military politics (in Libya’s case) and strengthen their hold (as in Yemen).

Jihadists have long thrived in chaotic environments such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia. Indeed, this is exactly why the leadership of the Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula/AQAP/ left Saudi Arabia and relocated to the more permissive environment of Yemen. Because of this lack of government focus and the opportunity to gather weapons, militant groups such as AQAP, the strongest of al Qaeda’s regional franchise groups, have been provided with a golden opportunity in Yemen. So the deteriorating security situation in Yemen and a military stalemate or spiraling violent conflict in Libya will play to the hands of terrorist groups. This explains why the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group/LIFG/ witnessed resurgence in the fighting in Eastern Libya, though its capabilities are still low. Inevitably, the group could serve as a conduit for the Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb/AQIM/ for the supply of armaments (even from Ghadafi) and to expand its zone of operations to Libya. In Somalia, the death of bin Laden will definitely play into the divisions within the top leadership of Harakhat al-Shabaab. Mainly it will affect the moral and standing of those leaders who chose to swore a personal oath to bin Laden. Relations with al-Qaeda and the status of foreign fighters in Somalia has been one of the core issues surrounding the relations within the top leadership of jihadist groups in Somalia. That leaves America and the world in a slightly changed geopolitical environment.

The result of all this is that:
• Given his stature, symbolic significance and source of ultimate message bin Laden’s death will likely perpetuate the process of decline in al-Qaeda.
• Between the Arab uprising and the death of bin Laden, it is hard to imagine greater blows to al-Qaeda’s ideology and organization.
• However it is hard to believe the death of bin Laden will result in the death of the global jihadist movement: A man is dead but the ideology struggles to live on.
• The threat from the global jihadist movement will continue in the short term with no real change.
• This means that pressure needs to be maintained on the al Qaeda core so it will not have the chance to recover, retool and return to attacking the United States.
• Pressure also needs to be maintained on the jihadist franchise groups so they cannot mature operationally to the point where they become transnational, strategic threats.
• This being the case, the impact on the US, at both subjective and objective levels is enormous. The emotional closure and sense of justice done aside, the repercussions on the reputation and power of the US should not be discounted.
• Perhaps the most important thing to come from the way bin Laden died is the sense that the United States is still an unintended empire of vast power, with the capability to do whatever it takes to get things done around the world. May 1 2011 reasserted the view “America always gets her man,” and with it the image of a highly competent US military has flashed across the globe. The likes of Hollywood have got a rich material to play with and revive American patriotism for the years to come.
Besides,
• The confluence of several events in recent months is more likely to lead to a deep strategic thinking in Washington, the most important of which is the possibility for a dramatic shift in U.S. strategy. It may precipitate the timely withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan and instead lead to some reinforcements in the Persian Gulf. The U.S. mission in Afghanistan, as stated by Obama, is the destruction of al Qaeda—in particular, of the apex leadership that once proved capable of carrying out transnational, high-casualty attacks.
• This will definitely lead to a reordering of the priorities in US Defense and Intelligence agencies. This may be already happening. With the counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan dissipating, the nation-building mission in Afghanistan becomes unnecessary and nonessential. On this particular issue, Barack Obama can easily make his point. His hands are now free which allows him to take some practical steps as well. This may be one reason why General David Petraeus is leaving his powerful position directing the war in Afghanistan to run the CIA. This is not to say that bin Laden's death and Petraeus' new appointment are anything beyond coincidental. But I can readily believe that this is one factor, if not the only one. In many ways, the killing of bin Laden by US forces is not less dramatic than the September 11 attacks. Somehow, it seems, a threshold of some kind has been reached. It will be interesting to see if this is indeed more than just a little bit of closure.

The killing of Bin Laden: What to make of it?

The death of Osama Bin Laden had struck a chord with many Americans and millions around the world. This was true not only of those who suffered from acts of terrorism, but of those who barely new about Al-Qaeda and its leader. Many others have been easily bamboozled. In the US however there is a sense of retributive justice done. Because of this sense of fulfilled vengeance, the death of bin Laden will certainly be one of those events that people will remember, like the 9/11 attacks themselves. Apart from the sense of justice and closure the killing of bin Laden brings, however, his death will likely have some practical impact on the jihadist movement and the war on terror.

The killing of bin Laden by US Special Forces in his, reasonably comfortable, hideout in Pakistan is another blow to the already declining al-Qaeda narrative. For the past several years, the leaders of the organization have been limited to fighting on the ideological battlefield, waging a war of propaganda and attempting to promote the ideology of jihadism in an effort to radicalize Muslims and prompt them to act. Al-Qaeda’s appeal and political support has been declining over the last couple of years until it suffered a heavy blow towards the end of 2010 due to the popular uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa. So, in terms of ideology, political slogans, agendas and narratives, the uprisings have embarrassed Al-Qaida and associates as well as other radical groups in the Middle East and Africa. I must say the political future of al-Qaeda will be determined by the course and outcome of the uprisings in the Arab world. As a result or despite this, there has already been a parallel decline in the organizational and operational capabilities of al-Qaeda. 

As argued in a previous topic (http://www.currentanalyst.com/index.php/revealed/156-obamas-common-sense), al-Qaeda’s top layer has become weaker, while its associates around the world have multiplied. Its core has become weaker while its affiliates have been stronger. The catch is that, the so-called  associates, sometimes referred to as ‘local franchises’ have not yet developed the operational capability that al-Qaeda proper once had to organize smart, sophisticated and large scale transnational terrorist attacks. Then there are those groups around the globe but who are not formally affiliated with the al Qaeda core or one of the regional franchises. And all of this has caused the al Qaeda core to become primarily an organization that produces propaganda and provides guidance and inspiration to the other jihadist elements rather than an organization focused on conducting operations.

In practical terms, long before the death of bin Laden al-Qaeda had become just a message, an idea or a sort of ideology. In fact it has become a trend personified by bin Laden. His picture, like his speech, was full of arsenal with a massive appeal. So his death will likely perpetuate the process of decline. Obama’s focus on decapitating the top leadership of al-Qaeda has paid off. Between the Arab uprising and the death of bin Laden, it is hard to imagine greater blows to al-Qaeda’s ideology and organization. This means that it is hard to believe the death of bin Laden will result in the death of the global jihadist movement: A man is dead but the ideology struggles to live on. Indeed, in some areas this may result in fervent anti-Americanism as a short term response to the incident. This may be particularly true of Pakistan. While the average Pakistani may not care too much about bin Laden, public sentiment is running very high against U.S. operations in Pakistan, and this operation could serve to inflame such sentiments.

Notwithstanding this fact, international terrorism is still real and it will continue to pose dangers to global security. Certainly, grassroots terrorists can and will continue to kill people, but they lack the ability to conduct dramatic, strategic attacks. There are still groups that call themselves al-Qaeda in Pakistan, Yemen, North Africa, Somalia and elsewhere. This is not the right place to go to the details of each organization and its regional ramifications.  But I will dare to say the results are mixed. Whenever there is smooth transition, such as in Egypt and Tunisia, terrorists are not able to find a foothold; meanwhile legally registered Islamist movements (such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Al-Nahda in Tunisia) will have the chance to further mobilize their supporters and entrench themselves. Indeed, such groups have gained long-term and strategic capital. The merger of Islamists and democrats is an explosive combination. Apart, they do little. Together, they could genuinely destabilize the region and even further undermine the U.S. effort against jihadists. Where as in situations of an ongoing violent conflict, such as Yemen and Libya, terrorist organizations will have more advantages to make an entry into military politics (in Libya’s case) and strengthen their hold (as in Yemen).

Jihadists have long thrived in chaotic environments such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia. Indeed, this is exactly why the leadership of the Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula/AQAP/ left Saudi Arabia and relocated to the more permissive environment of Yemen. Because of this lack of government focus and the opportunity to gather weapons, militant groups such as AQAP, the strongest of al Qaeda’s regional franchise groups, have been provided with a golden opportunity in Yemen. So the deteriorating security situation in Yemen and a military stalemate or spiraling violent conflict in Libya will play to the hands of terrorist groups. This explains why the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group/LIFG/ witnessed resurgence in the fighting in Eastern Libya, though its capabilities are still low. Inevitably, the group could serve as a conduit for the Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb/AQIM/ for the supply of armaments (even from Ghadafi) and to expand its zone of operations to Libya. In Somalia, the death of bin Laden will definitely play into the divisions within the top leadership of Harakhat al-Shabaab. Mainly it will affect the moral and standing of those leaders who chose to swore a personal oath to bin Laden. Relations with al-Qaeda and the status of foreign fighters in Somalia has been one of the core issues surrounding the relations within the top leadership of jihadist groups in Somalia. That leaves America and the world in a slightly changed geopolitical environment.

The result of all this is that:
• Given his stature, symbolic significance and source of ultimate message bin Laden’s death will likely perpetuate the process of decline in al-Qaeda.
• Between the Arab uprising and the death of bin Laden, it is hard to imagine greater blows to al-Qaeda’s ideology and organization.
• However it is hard to believe the death of bin Laden will result in the death of the global jihadist movement: A man is dead but the ideology struggles to live on.
• The threat from the global jihadist movement will continue in the short term with no real change.
• This means that pressure needs to be maintained on the al Qaeda core so it will not have the chance to recover, retool and return to attacking the United States.
• Pressure also needs to be maintained on the jihadist franchise groups so they cannot mature operationally to the point where they become transnational, strategic threats.
• This being the case, the impact on the US, at both subjective and objective levels is enormous. The emotional closure and sense of justice done aside, the repercussions on the reputation and power of the US should not be discounted.
• Perhaps the most important thing to come from the way bin Laden died is the sense that the United States is still an unintended empire of vast power, with the capability to do whatever it takes to get things done around the world. May 1 2011 reasserted the view “America always gets her man,” and with it the image of a highly competent US military has flashed across the globe. The likes of Hollywood have got a rich material to play with and revive American patriotism for the years to come.
Besides,
• The confluence of several events in recent months is more likely to lead to a deep strategic thinking in Washington, the most important of which is the possibility for a dramatic shift in U.S. strategy. It may precipitate the timely withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan and instead lead to some reinforcements in the Persian Gulf. The U.S. mission in Afghanistan, as stated by Obama, is the destruction of al Qaeda—in particular, of the apex leadership that once proved capable of carrying out transnational, high-casualty attacks.
• This will definitely lead to a reordering of the priorities in US Defense and Intelligence agencies. This may be already happening. With the counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan dissipating, the nation-building mission in Afghanistan becomes unnecessary and nonessential. On this particular issue, Barack Obama can easily make his point. His hands are now free which allows him to take some practical steps as well. This may be one reason why General David Petraeus is leaving his powerful position directing the war in Afghanistan to run the CIA. This is not to say that bin Laden's death and Petraeus' new appointment are anything beyond coincidental. But I can readily believe that this is one factor, if not the only one. In many ways, the killing of bin Laden by US forces is not less dramatic than the September 11 attacks. Somehow, it seems, a threshold of some kind has been reached. It will be interesting to see if this is indeed more than just a little bit of closure.